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While competition is good for consumers and economies, competition rules alone cannot necessarily 
produce adequate outcomes for all circumstances. Other norms, particularly regulatory norms, are also 
often likely to be relevant. The current legal and policy debates about ‘disruptive innovation’ highlight 
the need for a healthy mixture of competition and regulation. This paper offers a series of reflections 
arising from the challenges posed by disruptive products, services and business models. These 
reflections cover matters such as the capacity of legal procedures to keep pace with rapidly changing 
market environments. Competition advocacy can help regulators decide controversial points. The paper 
discusses several sectors, such as the car-riding and overnight sleeping sectors, in which different 
interests must simultaneously be accommodated within the boundaries of national tradition and 
European Union law. As discussed, some of these matters have now been adjudicated by the EU Courts. 
The related subjects of the acquisition of data as well as the requirements of privacy and data protection 
principles are also considered. The paper reflects on the role of network effects and on the difficult 
choices to be made with regard to the wisdom of relying on competition law or on the nature of 
innovation itself to deliver appropriate responses to the growth of network-based economic power; and 
the paper notes but does not suggest a remedy for the problem of delay as inimical to effective judicial 
review. 
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Summary thoughts* 
I have two and a half, possibly three, thoughts to contribute in this paper. The first is that while 
competition with a small ‘c’ is obviously good for consumers, good for opening up choices, good for 
injecting novelty into the marketplace, and good for rewarding risk-taking innovators, we cannot rely 
on the Competition Rules (with capital letters) alone to deliver adequate outcomes. This is not because 
the rules are too vague—indeed, their high level of generality should be an asset in flexibility—but 
because other norms are also relevant.  
Competition authorities should have a seat in the stadium where the new rules are battled over, but they 
should not aspire to decide the outcome of the contest. The regulatory concerns cannot be dismissed on 
the ground that consumers will be better off with more competition. In the case of two huge disruptive 
waves of innovation, in the car-riding and overnight sleeping sectors, public regulations of the 
marketplaces were and are extensive, reflecting genuine public policy concerns, some more persuasive 
than others. The quality of the regime and the quality of the services delivered are very relevant to how 
the regulator should decide. Competition advocacy is very important, and its capacity to recognize 
failures, abuses and ugly bullying practices is an important role. But competition law should not prevail 
automatically over all other legal norms. 
The second thought is that the conventional stately rhythm of decision making, subject of course to 
sceptical, respectful, rigorous and thorough judicial review, may be too slow for effective intervention. 
I realize that I have written frequently about the need to improve due process rights in procedures before 
the European Commission; and I realize that perfection and effectiveness in enforcement are not easy 
to reconcile. The speed of change in the marketplace is sometimes astonishing. Massive alterations in 
how we interact with new technologies can occur in a few months, far faster than a properly conducted 
competition case. There has been a tendency to settle dominance cases in Brussels, which means no 
judicial review at all in a field where there are very few cases. One possible reaction would be to suggest 
that we need more interim measures initiatives from the enforcers: not quick and dirty, but a provisional 
intense assessment of a problem. Possibly the decision should describe the principles at stake rather than 
prove a condemnation in a thousand paragraphs. Our recently acquired rules on expedited procedures 
might help, but speed has a cost. Alternatively, we could be rethinking traditional approaches to 
remedies.  
The third thought is rather gloomy: rather than a helpful observation, it acknowledges a problem which 
sounds insoluble. In the case of a sector which is regulated, we can hope that regulators will intervene, 
and that competition law can correct or constrain the acquisition of dominant power. Disruptive 
innovation involving platforms which are data-driven seems much more difficult to control or moderate 
in the public interest. The platforms become stronger and richer as the weeks go by, and expand into 
new sectors which were unimaginable 20 years ago, and were still fanciful 10 years ago. Characterizing 
product innovation as itself abusive does not seem attractive as a matter of policy; nor is compulsory 
dismembering of a successful firm. But we do not yet seem to possess satisfactory mechanisms for 
delivering better conditions of competition in such situations. I am not condemning, just wondering 
doubtfully. 
                                                   
*
 The author is Honorary Professor at the University of Glasgow and Judge at the General Court of the European Union. These 
remarks are very obviously personal comments for an academic gathering which I have attended since its inception in 1995. 
They certainly do not reflect the Court’s view on anything. I thank my colleagues for stimulating ideas. 
Ian Forrester 
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Speed and unpredictability 
The swiftness of commercial developments can be amazing. New products emerge, succeed, fail or 
survive at a place which astonishes a person over fifty. The personal histories of the founders of two of 
the most shockingly disruptive new businesses, Uber and Airbnb reveal early failure, early problems, 
personal dramas and, in a quite short time, vast wealth (from student grunge to billions of turnover in 6 
years), momentum and success for the organization.1  
Disruptive innovation probably means not an improvement on the established way of doing things but 
a completely new manner of approaching the market. There has been a transformation of the market for 
music. Pianos used to be made and sold in vast numbers, since ordinary people enjoyed music-making, 
and sheet music was a thriving business. Then radio offered live and recorded music. Pianos are much 
rarer today, though of more consistent quality. Phonographs and gramophone records gave way to tapes, 
then the Walkman, and the laser-reading CD player and the Discman, and now we can stream music on 
smart phones for a very attractive price. Much technological creativity was devoted in the seventies, 
eighties and nineties, rather than monetizing consumer appeal, to thwarting the growing technical 
capacity to play music or films without paying royalties. The inventor may discover that the invention 
leads off in unexpected directions. (As Thomas Legrand of France-Inter has noted, one of the fathers of 
the gramophone believed that the new machine’s principal application would be to preserve the voices 
of the dead.2)  
Amazon has upended the world of retailing by delivering at speed, regardless of the cost or need, almost 
anything most people are likely to want. It has established a concept supermarket in Seattle where the 
customer’s presence in the shop is identified (maybe via an app on the customer’s phone) and the 
customer’s picking up and removing or replacing a head of broccoli is recorded. The customer leaves 
without any check-out and his credit card is debited for the purchase. Amazon is a massive disruptor. 
The unpredictability of events and whether a new product / service / app / game will be successful can 
be equally astonishing. It was not obvious that Uber would prevail over Lyft. Maybe it will fail. Vivino 
is an app which allows wine lovers to take a picture of a wine label, then pauses for a few moments, 
then reports on where the wine comes from (unless it is unrecognized rotgut), advises on what other 
drinkers say about it, and in what nearby shops it can be found and at what price. Great fun, tremendously 
ingenious, harmless, pro-competitive and excellent for enhancing oenological snobbery: a completely 
novel idea (at least to me) which has been successful. I use Vivino much more often than Snapchat, 
which allows the user to send an image to a friend and to arrange the settings so as to delete the image 
from the friend’s phone after a certain time. Spotify and other streaming techniques allow users to access 
a huge catalogue of music without having to own or store it. I cannot guess at how many millions of 
songs are listened to every hour on smart phones around the world. 
The levels of unpredictability and ignorance (ignorance enhances unpredictability in this area) are very 
high. I recollect deciding not to invest in Google in the 1990s, since I could not see how a free internet 
browsing site would one day make money. I know of an excellent lawyer who achieved by internal 
promotion exceptional success in a famous giant of the IT age. What could be a more glittering prospect? 
Yet shortly thereafter he left to join a company whose name I did not even know. 
The phenomenon of unpredictability and risk is by no means confined to grey-haired lawyers. Several 
famous names have confronted massive existential challenges which put their future at risk or at least 
in question. Facebook had to cope with customers’ lurch to mobile smart phones—and did so amazingly 
rapidly. Fake news and the massive public anxiety about the influence of the malignant over the ignorant 
and the naïve may well present another existential challenge. Apple lurched through commercial 
                                                   
1  The Upstarts, by Brad Stone, just published by Penguin Random House, gives a lively, thorough account of their history. 
2  Thomas Lagrande, ‘Macron … Disruptif ?’ (5 October 2016), https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/l-edito-politique/l-edito-
politique-05-octobre-2016. 
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disasters in the 1990s. Microsoft had celebrated litigation battles about its business model of an ever-
expanding range of technical features presented by Windows, as well as problems related to spam and 
junk mail. IBM in the last century was a prime antitrust target in both the US and in Europe.3 Amazon’s 
social model is harshly criticized. 
The surprises are not confined to the pleasures of music, wine and pictures: currency itself is now on 
offer in electronic form, often called crypto currency, of which the best known is Bitcoin. The very idea 
of a currency which is ‘homemade’ not issued by a central bank is extraordinary. It is a deflationary 
currency whose algorithm has a maximum predetermined number of coins (about 21 million) which can 
be ‘mined’. Thus, a bitcoin holder in Venezuela will be able to avoid the consequences of local 
hyperinflation. The value of the currency is rooted in the difficulty of creating the next unit of currency: 
its security contributes to its value. Those who dislike or distrust public authorities trust instead in the 
power of computers on a peer-to-peer network to manage the process of ‘mining’ more coins. They do 
not need a treasury official or a central bank for purposes of authentication of the unit of currency. The 
blockchain creates a private secure platform, which is totally independent of government and immune 
to fluctuations in the price of gold. The value of the digital token (the bitcoin) varies but the underlying 
token remains secure. About 16,300,000 have thus far been ‘mined’ with a theoretical value of about 
$34 billion. (Early adopters who lent their computing power to the mining effort were part of a hobby 
movement which led to the emergence of a real market that was the launch pad for today’s thriving 
business scene which is backed by many supporters and huge computing power.)  
Bitcoins and other crypto currencies are traded on a secondary market. The value of the first bitcoin 
transactions was negotiated by individuals on the bitcointalk forums with one notable transaction of 
10,000 bitcoins used indirectly to purchase two pizzas. The values have ranged from $0.003 in 2010 to 
$31.00 in 2011 and to $2209.29 in 2017. This anecdote illustrates how something incapable of being 
imagined before the advent of huge privately accessible computing power has become a big business. 
The technology is getting support for other decentralized secure networks like ‘Etherium’ which offers 
a virtual currency and means of rendering services for payment in the currency. 
Twenty years ago, Google was a cheerful aid to internet searching. Nine years ago, Uber was 
experimenting with how to bring taxi drivers and clients physically closer. Today, driverless cars move 
(cautiously) round the Google campus. Uber is delivering millions of rides around the world. Thomas 
Friedman suggests that by the time the regulation of ridesharing has been perfected, driverless cars may 
have made those rules obsolete.4 He further suggests that understanding a new technology and regulating 
it intelligently needs from 10 to 15 years, but then notes that the technology may have passed through 
success, then dominance, then decline, in seven years. 
Examples of noisy regulation 
Regulations are the subject of debate, as they should be in a democratic society. The controversy may 
relate to safety, tax, insurance, morality, traditional well-established values, pitting mastodons versus 
nimble creators, technophiles versus old incumbents, and of course new money versus long invested 
patterns and barriers to exit. I have the impression that the experiences of Uber and Airbnb have involved 
fiercely contested lobbying in which neither side (call them disruptors opposed to traditionalists) had an 
obvious advantage. 
                                                   
3  Apple and Uber despite their success confront real competitors. The transportation company Lyft, launched in 2012 and 
present in 200 cities in the United States, works similarly to Uber and offers multiple levels of services through its 
smartphone application. As for smartphones and mobile computers, Samsung is one of Apple’s main competitors, with the 
Android operating system running on its phones and tablets. 
4  Thomas Friedman, Thank You for Being Late (2016). 
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The Uber story is a good way of illustrating my first proposition. In a number of states in the United 
States, cars which carry more than one person are entitled to use an express lane while cars with a 
solitary driver fume in slower traffic lanes. This phenomenon led to the birth of ‘ridesharing’, which 
was in its turn boosted by the mobile phone (smart phones came later) and the availability of computing 
resources to plot routes so that sharers and drivers could get together. Originally Uber allowed only 
licensed taxi drivers (or black limousine drivers) to use its system. That eased the safety and insurance 
concerns. Then a competitor went further: allowing any private citizen with a driving licence and a car 
to collect passengers who were nearby as identified by a telephone app. This step helped transform 
sprawling suburbs with no public transport and few taxis. Ordinary citizens with a car and time on their 
hands could make some money. Uber was unsure if such a step was lawful, but it wanted to chase its 
competitors who did not have such hesitations. 
There ensued a fierce session of passionate advocacy as California grappled with what line to take about 
ridesharing companies. Uber’s leader, Travis Kalanick, proved to be an unorthodox but unusually 
successful lobbyist. Instead of being bland and cuddly, he was ferocious and confrontational. He 
summoned up hundreds of e-mails from liberated Uber fans who either drove Uber cars or used them. 
The local taxi model was unsatisfactory in many ways. The battle was loud and vigorous. His legal team 
coined the term ‘Travis’s Law’ to describe his approach: 
Our product is so superior to the status quo that if we give people the opportunity to see it or try it, in 
any place in the world where government has to be at least somewhat responsive to the people, they 
will demand it and defend its right to exist. 
The taxi cab lobby was vociferous and the voices of Uber, Sidecar, Zimride and Lyft were all heard 
clamorously. Finally, there was a decision to legalize ridesharing’s commercialization by licensing 
‘transportation network companies’. 
Parallel but different conversations occurred in major European cities. Indeed, two cases were brought 
before the ECJ, one from Barcelona5 and one from Lille.6 In the Spanish case, Uber Technologies Inc. 
argued that it provided technical, organizational and other resources whereby both the platform 
providing the service and the vehicle owners were remunerated. Uber Technologies did not hold the 
administrative licences and authorizations referred to in the national legislation governing taxi services; 
nor did the owners and drivers of the vehicles have the licences and permits referred to in those rules. 
On the other side, a taxi drivers’ association in Barcelona argued that the fact that the defendant lacked 
licences and authorizations amounted to a breach of the provisions governing competition in Spain: 
Uber, it said, enjoyed an unfair advantage and deceitfully indicated to the user that the service provided 
was lawful. So, did Uber Systems Spain provide a ‘transport service’ in Barcelona? Or did it provide an 
‘information society service’ covered by the ‘Information Society’ Directive 98/347 or a ‘service in the 
internal market’ within the meaning of Directive 2006/123?8 Services falling within the scope of the two 
Directives present the advantage of not being subject to any prior authorizations and are, in principle, 
immune to any restrictions in accordance with the principle of freedom to provide services. In the end, 
the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held that a paid service employing a smartphone app to 
connect non-professional drivers using their own vehicle with persons making urban journeys was 
inherently linked to a transport service and hence was to be classified as ‘a service in the field of 
transport’. Such a service fell outside the scope of both of the Directives. 
                                                   
5  C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi. 
6  C-320/16, Uber France. 
7  Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision 
of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 204, 
21.7.1998, p. 37. 
8  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal 
market, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, pp. 36-68 
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In the French case, Uber France was accused of misleading commercial practices (i.e., the publication 
on its websites of commercial communications encouraging consumers, drivers and users to participate 
in a transport service provided by private individuals for money, giving the impression that the service 
was lawful). Uber France replied that the purpose of its services was to put individuals in touch with 
one another, so that they could share a common journey, in the spirit of a ‘collaborative economy’—a 
French version of Californian ridesharing. The defendant argued that its services were not organized 
with the intention of making a profit and were instead a simple technical aid which enabled individuals 
to get in touch. However, the referring court was sceptical and noted that Uber France was recruiting 
and selecting drivers who wished to perform paid work, not merely to share a planned journey with 
another individual. Further, Uber fixed the rates and received payment for the journey, from which it 
deducted its own remuneration before paying the remainder to the driver, and it prepared the invoices. 
The status of the various parties involved in the process was ambiguous: the driver was somewhat like 
a professional but could be an amateur; while the person carried was a customer who paid for the 
transport but could be described as someone who merely shares a journey and makes a contribution to 
the costs. The French court expressed a concern that requirements relating to the carriage of the 
passengers, in particular those relating to safety and insurance, be respected. 
Uber argued that the provisions or French law it had allegedly breached9 fell within the scope of 
‘technical regulations’ which relate to the ‘information society’ services under Directive 98/34. 
According to this argument, since the provisions had not been notified to the Commission prior to their 
promulgation, they could not be enforced against the defendant. Advocate General Szpunar broadly 
rejected most of Uber’s contentions and considered that the service provided by the company was not 
an information society service but a transport service. From an economic perspective, he explained, 
transporting passengers constituted the main component of the service. He therefore recommended that 
the Member States should in principle be free to regulate Uber’s activity. The Grand Chamber of the 
Court ultimately confirmed that a national prohibition of an unauthorized system putting customers in 
contact with persons carrying passengers by road for remuneration was indeed a prohibition of a service 
in the field of transport. Here again, therefore, the service was excluded from the scope of both of the 
Directives. 
That was Paris and Barcelona. As to London, former Mayor Boris Johnson—as of this writing the 
Foreign Secretary of the UK—was close to the vociferous taxi drivers of London, but must have 
disappointed them by saying that the regulators ‘could not disinvent the internet’. As a result, today 
Uber and other ride booking services are making big inroads on the use of taxis. London taxi drivers are 
passionate in lamenting the encroachment on their profession, entry to which is notoriously difficult due 
to the need to master ‘The Knowledge’—which is publicly and severely examined. 
Airbnb had different but comparable experiences in many cities around the world. Should it be regarded 
as a wholesome vehicle for letting homeowners make a little money by admitting guests who want to 
spend a couple of nights in a distant city? Or should it be regarded as an underhand way of avoiding the 
extensive (and expensive) rules which burden small hoteliers? The hoteliers and the trade unions who 
defended hotel employees were maybe not as audible as a honking protest of cab drivers, but they did 
have an impact. And accordingly, in Paris, Tokyo, Portland, San Francisco and elsewhere regulations 
about taxes, fire escapes, and a maximum number of nights have been adopted. As recently as last 
October, New York adopted yet another attempt to strike a fair balance between the various interests. 
Regardless of these tussles, Airbnb reported that in 2016 it was responsible for more than 1,250,000 
bookings every night. 
I mention these debates at length because they seem to confirm that these questions are being well 
addressed (albeit diversely addressed) without relying on Articles 101 or 102. It is not my purpose to 
                                                   
9  Specifically, Article L.3124-13 of the Code des transports prohibits the organization of a system for putting customers in 
touch with persons carrying on the activities of the carriage by road for consideration using vehicles, where such persons 
are neither road transport undertakings nor taxi drivers. 
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suggest that either Uber or Airbnb is right or wrong or that it should or should not prevail in one or other 
of its regulatory battles. My point is that the competition rules are not a silver bullet which can target 
accurately and solve such a vast problem which presents difficulties and opportunities. Neither side was 
entirely happy, but neither side was paralyzed. Consumers are getting the benefit of choice. Competition 
advocacy has helped the regulator to decide. 
Timing and Delay 
Competition cases in well-respected jurisdictions are rarely completed quickly. In 2016, the average 
duration of proceedings at the General Court was 38.2 months in competition cases, which are 
commonly document-heavy and present multiple questions of fact and law. The average duration of all 
cases decided by the General Court was 18.7 months. The duration is going down, which is good news 
and which reflects a priority of the Court. But to consider the effectiveness of the process of enforcement 
we should look at the entirety of the time consumed, from the start of the controversy in the marketplace 
to the disposition of the case in court. 
The courts are a vital part of quality control. This is an old debate. If we are too deferential, too ready 
to assume the public authority was right, the authority may become careless. But if we are too ready to 
second guess the authority’s conclusions we may encroach on its duties. But whether robust or 
deferential (and after Chalkor and Menarini robustness is required) the outcome must be delivered 
promptly. Yet under today’s conditions I would guess that from first complaint to DG Comp, through 
investigation, statement of objections, hearing, decision to appeal and judgement would likely consume 
at least four years. The bigger the market and the vaster the consequences, the more time is likely to 
pass. The time during which the controversial practice is in force would prolong the period, of course. 
That calls for a fresh approach. Four and a bit years may mean more than an entire business cycle. 
I have serious doubts about whether the procedures we traditionally use are adequate for the task where 
the market place is moving faster than the enforcers and the judges. This is not a criticism, more an 
admission of uneasiness.  
In some complex cases the delay can be much longer. In Groupement des Cartes bancaires (T-491/07 
and C-67/13 P), the duration of the procedures has been about 14 years, from the first notification about 
the terms on which new banks would be admitted to the old banks’ credit card system made to the 
Commission in 2002, to the judgment of the General Court in 2016. The Commission adopted two 
statements of objections, in 2004 and in 2006. In 2007, the Commission adopted a decision in which it 
took the view that the Groupement had infringed Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU) by establishing 
a series of pricing measures with an anticompetitive object or effect. The Groupement appealed to the 
General Court, which dismissed the action in 2012. An appeal against this decision was brought before 
the Court of Justice. On 11 September 2014, the Court of Justice set aside the judgment of the General 
Court and referred the case back to the General Court, on the ground that the case requires an 
examination of complex questions of fact based on elements which were not assessed by the General 
Court in the judgment under appeal. On 30 June 2016 the General Court rendered its judgment. 
The Cartes Bancaires saga was a lengthy one and involved more than one statement of objections, so it 
was not typical. But also Microsoft, GSK Spain and other big decisions took time to prepare, time to 
decide, and time to review judicially. Courts do not usually move swiftly, as issues are complex and 
parties need time to describe their arguments usefully. Big problems usually take more time. In a number 
of cases still under appeal parties have demanded and obtained compensation for the damages they 
suffered through not having received a judicial outcome in due time.10 
                                                   
10  In Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Union of 10 January 2017 (T-577/14) and Kendrion v Union of 1 February 2017 (T- 
479/14), the General Court ordered the European Union to pay compensation to the applicants for the material damage 
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As noted, the General Court now possesses an expedited procedure. The expedited procedure was used 
in GSA and SGI v Parliament, a judgment of 10 November 2015 (T-321/15), where the applicants had 
submitted tenders relating to the guarding of the European Parliament’s site in Brussels. The contract 
had been awarded to another tenderer. The appeal was lodged at the General Court on 22 June 2015 and 
the General Court decided of its own motion to adjudicate the case under the expedited procedure, under 
Article 151(2) of its Rules of Procedure. The duration of proceedings (till 10 November 2015) was thus 
4.5 months. 
The application in the classical manner of competition law disciplines to technologies that are evolving 
swiftly may be problematic. Both enforcers and the judiciary need to reflect on whether existing 
procedures are appropriate in every circumstance. Speed is not impossible. The EU Commissioner in 
Porto at the ICN conference mentioned the possibility of interim measures as a means of accelerating 
disposition of cases while getting the benefit of possible judicial scrutiny. So it is not impossible to 
imagine solutions. But the current patterns of decision making seem too chronophage too time-
consuming for modern technological markets. 
The Special Problem of Data 
The acquisition of data 
I have described the current state of the tussle between disruptors and traditionalists involving 
ridesharing and home sharing, suggesting that the real problem of competition must involve regulatory 
choices as well as competition advocacy. My third comment relates to a sector where regulations are 
not very relevant to the basic business model. Although the success of Airbnb and Uber has been 
prodigious, the success of the FAANG five (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google) has been 
beyond remarkable. The stock market value of these companies is 2.4 trillion dollars or 
$2,400,000,000,000—more than all the world’s car companies, more than the domestic economy of 
most countries. The price of an Amazon share recently touched $1000, and on the same day Google’s 
parent was at $997. We know that wealth and size are not in competition terms a demerit. But the wealth 
and the size are awesome. The success of the industry leaders has been fuelled not by acquisition (though 
it helped Microsoft to buy Skype and Facebook to acquire WhatsApp and Instagram) but by the 
amassing of huge amounts of data which permit the intelligent targeting of future customers. 
The internet offers many services for no monetary cost to consumers. When a consumer visits a 
website, she sees a collage of material: the kitten videos she is looking for, or the article on James 
VI and his family she needs for a history exam; links to other points on the site; tools for interacting 
with the site; and of course advertisements (along the edges of the screen, or possibly a video that 
will play prior to the chosen content). These advertisements are usually targeted, that is tailored for 
the specific visitor. If I look at a page in the court, Luxembourg restaurants a r e  brought to my 
attention. This is not accidental. A  complete cycle has been completed, beginning with an analysis 
of the space available for the ad (the physical dimensions o f  t he screen) and a review of the 
visitor’s personal interests based on prior browsing and shopping history (compiled from the cookies 
present on the user's system—small packets of code the system is able to read and which have a 
‘fingerprint’ that tells the site where the user has been and what she has done in the past). Based 
on this analysis, among other criteria, certain advertising agents that might be interested in trying to 
sell the user something (hotels, tools, toys, cosmetics, holidays) are notified to bid. The bidding 
process pits different ad agents against each other in an auction. The agents are programs or 
algorithms that analyse much of the same data as before, decide the maximum amount to spend to 
place an ad in front of the particular consumer (generally minute fractions of a cent per placement). 
                                                   
suffered by the company as a result of the breach of the obligation to adjudicate within a reasonable time. In both cases the 
length of the proceedings exceeded by 20 months the reasonable time for adjudicating. 
Ian Forrester 
8 Department of Law Working Papers 
This whole process takes just milliseconds, and most consumers never know that such a complex 
dance of machines is ever taking place. They just know they get free Google service when writing a 
paper on the foreign policy of the Stuart kings or when looking for a cute video to include in a birthday 
greeting. 
The advertisement management companies (the ones who house the auctions) offer a service that 
advertisers want to pay for. The more advertisers are willing to pay, the more revenue a website 
can bring in. The more revenue a site can bring in, the more it can offer to its consumers and the more 
people will visit it. Thus, a virtuous (or vicious, depending on one’s opinion) cycle is created. As a 
result, more and more data are collected on those who use the internet. 
I was recently told of a man in the US who first found out he was to be a grandfather because his fifteen-
year-old daughter had received a book of coupons in the mail from the local supermarket. The coupons 
were aimed at an expectant mother. His young daughter was obviously not a candidate for motherhood. 
He went to the store to complain and received apologies. A few weeks later when customer service 
called to reiterate the company’s remorse, the man had to apologize in return. He was soon to become a 
grandfather.  The shop had been able to tell this and a lot more about the daughter from her internet 
activity. 
Privacy and data protection 
Today the problem of intrusive snooping is somewhat separate from the handling of personal data from 
employment, communications, medical records, physical location records, personal biographical data 
and the like. I mention the topic to note that the field is not immune to regulatory concerns, but the most 
intense regulatory, privacy, touches a theme rather different from antitrust. Most data are stored at some 
point in an electronic format commonly on a third-party server, particularly in this age of cloud storage. 
Often, the third party is not in the same country as the originator, and may not even be on the same 
continent.11 Huge server farms in Ireland, for example, store vast amounts of data from all over the 
world.  
Sending an email to a private server or intranet may entail an electronic journey around the world 
and through multiple jurisdictions. 12
  
If there is a stored copy of that email available to the sender 
or recipient it will likely be at a server facility in relatively close proximity to the user. How that e-mail 
or data will be treated as far as privacy considerations are concerned varies greatly as between the EU 
and the US.  
One European privacy law practitioner working in the US has noted that for many European 
professionals, it seems that the US lacks any privacy protection at all, while from a US perspective the 
privacy laws of the EU seem crazy in their restrictions and intrusiveness.13 Americans seem to focus 
more on the individual's responsibility to protect their own data through non-participation if they so 
choose, and on allowing all actors on the internet as little interference from the authorities as possible.14
 
                                                   
11  Google and Microsoft are two of the largest cloud service providers. While they are both expanding their global  
infrastructure, the majority of the material still resides in the US. 
12  See https://www.oasis-open.org/khelp/kmlm/user_help/html/how_email_works.html. 
13  See http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2014/how-do-eu-and-us-privacy-regimes-compare. 
14  See for instance 47 U.S.C. § 230, which states: ‘No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.’ This protects ISPs from 
defamation charges based on information posted using their services. See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.2d 327 (4th 
Cir. 1997). 
Disruptive innovation and implications for competition policy 
European University Institute 9 
The laws amount to a curious mixture of freedom to act, freedom to contract, and a patchwork of 
organically developed statutory and common law protections of privacy and dignity.15 
Circuit Judge Fuentes of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals captured the American outlook on the 
subject of privacy—a sluggish or lethargic acceptance that it might be an unachievable goal—quite 
succinctly: 
Most of us understand that what we do on the Internet is not completely private. How could it be? 
We ask large companies to manage our email, we download directions from smartphones that can 
pinpoint our GPS coordinates, and we look for information online by typing our queries into 
search engines. We recognize, even if only intuitively, that our data has to be going somewhere. 
And indeed it does, feeding an entire system of trackers, cookies, and algorithms designed to capture 
and monetize the information we generate. Most of the time, we never think about this. We 
browse the Internet, and the data-collecting infrastructure of the digital world hums along quietly 
in the background.16 
The European view of internet privacy 
For many of the services that society needs to function, information must be collected and shared. 
For the efficient running of many businesses outside of the internet itself it is also necessary to share or 
move data from one entity to another, or at least from one jurisdiction to another even if it is under the 
control of the same entity. This is true in the banking sector, and insurance and health. Corporations 
with employees and customers around the world would wish to transfer data routinely. Originally, data 
transfer across the Atlantic was done through a ‘safe harbour’ agreement between the US and the EU. 17 
This agreement allowed the transfer of data to the US so long as the entity controlling the data conformed 
to standards equivalent in their level of protection to what would be required in Europe.18 This was 
ensured in the case of US companies by the publication of a privacy policy and submission to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 prohibiting application of ‘unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce, or [to the jurisdiction] of another statutory body that will 
effectively ensure compliance’ which would make that privacy policy fully binding.19  
                                                   
15  US courts have found that, by clicking on ‘I agree’, one is actually bound by the terms so long as the access and notice of 
those terms and conditions was presented or available in a manner such that a reasonable internet user could have known 
of their existence. See I. Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp., 183 F.Supp.2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding 
that online contracts were analogous to classic contracts; despite the form of presentation, the same rules apply for finding 
of their validity. By clicking ‘I agree’, the party manifested an intent to be bound); Specht v. Netscape Communications 
Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (where future Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor stated, concerning the validity of a 
contract that contained an arbitration clause: ‘Whether governed by the common law or by Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (‘UCC’), a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a manifestation of agreement between the 
parties.’ Here, a consumer’s clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if the offer 
did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download button would signify assent to those terms.’); Groff v. 
America Online, C.A. No. PC 97-0331 (R.I. Super. May. 27, 1998) (upholding the enforceability of agreements whereby 
a user, by continuing to use the site or service, agrees to the relevant terms and conditions); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, 
Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that some actual notice—more than a button on the bottom of the screen that 
would lead to a terms and conditions page—must be presented to the user in order for that user to agree to be bound by 
continuing to use the site). 
16  In re: Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016). 
17  The Commission implemented Decision 2000/520 under the authority granted it per Art. 25(6) of Directive 95/46. (‘The 
Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 31(2), that a third country ensures an adequate 
level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason of its domestic law or of the international 
commitments it has entered into, particularly upon conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5, for the 
protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of individuals.’) 
18  Decision 2000/520, Preamble recital (5). 
19  Ibid. 
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This regime became controversial after 2013 with the revelations of Edward Snowden concerning the 
intelligence collections efforts by the US government. The safe harbour agreement was applicable to 
private entities and did not take into account the ‘lawful’ seizure of information by government entities 
that might seem to contravene the publicly stated privacy policies of those entities.20
 
Max Schrems, 
an Austrian student privacy activist, brought a complaint against Facebook Ireland to the Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner (‘IDPC’), asking that the IDPC: halt the sharing of information between 
Facebook Ireland, the hub of Facebook’s European operations, and Facebook Inc.; investigate the 
potential for violations of EU law inherent in the newly revealed US collections regime; and review 
the safe harbour agreement in light of this investigation.21 
The Commissioner initially refused to do so on the ground that the safe harbour involved determinations 
made by the European Commission and that a national authority could not review or overturn the 
Commission’s findings.  
Ultimately the issue made its way to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, which among other things 
found that the safe harbour was not adequate for the protection of EU citizens’ private data that had been 
transferred into US jurisdiction.22 The decision provoked considerable excitement and gave rise to new 
agreements between the US and the EU with greater assurances of privacy protections for EU citizens. 
Following an interim agreement in August 2016, the EU adopted its General Data Protection Regulation 
with extraterritorial reach, applicable to any entity that handles, transfers, or monitors the personal 
information of an EU citizen, wherever that entity might be.23
 
In one sense, the Schrems case and its antecedents are irrelevant to the application of competition 
principles to ‘Big Data’. But in another sense the case demonstrates the high public sensitivity to the 
handling of data, and the difference between the European and American approaches to the handling of 
data. In another sense the history reveals a high level of sensitivity on the part of the public (and there 
are many different publics) about large firms, even though we use their services carelessly, casually, 
maybe recklessly. Should we blame the internet company for gathering the information? Is antitrust a 
relevant tool to control its conduct? 
Network Effects and Unexpected Effects 
There are competition law concerns. One is that possession of great creativity and great volumes of data 
can lead to new ventures in unexpected areas. Google has become a car designer. Facebook has become 
a news broadcaster. Amazon has become a book shop and may be soon a retail grocer. During the recent 
polls in Europe and America we have seen use of, and reliance on, social media to observe, to influence 
and to predict. It is possible to use what can be learned to predict tomorrow’s consumption patterns, or 
maybe to launch a trend or a movement or a fashion craze. (I learned the word ‘Nowcasting’ while 
preparing this paper). Fake news is another possible associated concern.  
The more questions that are put to Jeeves (the legendary butler of Bertie Wooster in the novels of PG 
Wodehouse and the name of an early internet search interlocutor) the more Jeeves will learn and the 
more helpful and rapid will be his responses. Why bother to train a new slave if there is an experienced 
one on another platform? And very evidently, the more data that the customer has delivered to the data 
gatherer, the more valuably precise will be the prediction about which wines, rugby tickets, clothes or 
Bhutanese restaurants may tempt the customer. While often experience equates to expertise, I think that 
this process is turbocharged in the case of searches done by a richly endowed site. The more it knows, 
                                                   
20  Decision 2000/520, Annex IV (B); C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., pt. 89. 
21  Schrems, pt. 27 
22  Ibid., pt. 36. 
23  See https://iapp.org/news/a/weve-got-a-finalized-privacy-shield-agreement-whats-new-2/. 
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the better it will be. Instead of tentative ideas it can make very precise proposals of attractive goods or 
services. The preciousness of the opportunity is confirmed by the fact that there has been an auction 
between offerors to decide who will pay for the privilege of a chance to catch the customer’s eye.  
And of course, we have known since the days of the elderly telephone companies that the attractiveness 
of a product increases as the number of other users using the same phone network grows. I speculate 
that even though we are offered a choice between search engines we are likely to use the one with which 
we are most familiar, and which generates answers at astonishing speed. On the other hand, alternatives 
are easily available—why not click on them? The answer is not clear.  
Should competition law hope that in ten years’ time another technology will have emerged? Or should 
it fear that the technical superiority of a dominant platform, richly endowed with data, will guarantee a 
permanently superior position? The answer is not obvious, and traditional notions about price are 
irrelevant when the consideration for the service is not monetary but the divulgation of insights into our 
own personalities, age, tastes, foibles and aspirations. 
Competition law is a means of disciplining dominant players by subjecting them to the extra 
requirements of the special responsibility imposed by Article 102. It is not a cure for dominance, and 
dominance is not in itself an infringement. (But a company like Tetrapak, which has had a series of 
competition law confrontations with an enforcement authority, may possibly feel uneasy about taking 
commercial initiatives.) 
One can imagine that the special responsibility might be said to include a duty on a dominant firm not 
to favour its own ventures or its own advertisers, not to discriminate between similar categories of user, 
and maybe a duty to share vital resources. Before concluding that there is a problem, however, the theory 
of harm needs to be clear, and the possible remedy must also make sense. It is not that it cannot be done, 
but reaching conclusions in due time is exceptionally difficult. These are important and uncertain 
questions. They present difficult issues of principle. I hope that judicial review of decisions about them 
can be performed in a timely manner such that the judgment emerges when it is still relevant. 
 
  
  
 
